Decision making under uncertainty. by Preuschoff, K. et al.
EDITORIAL
published: 20 November 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00218
Decision making under uncertainty
Kerstin Preuschoff1,2*, Peter N. C. Mohr3,4,5* and Ming Hsu6,7*
1 Laboratory of Computational Neuroscience, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
2 Laboratoire de Recherché en Neuroimagerie, Le Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois, Lausanne, Switzerland
3 Information Processing and Economic Decision Making, Department of Psychology, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
4 Economic Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
5 Psychology of Emotions and Affective Neuroscience, Department of Educational Science and Psychology, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
6 Neuroeconomics Laboratory, Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
7 Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
*Correspondence: kerstin.preuschoff@epfl.ch; peter.mohr@unibas.ch; mhsu@haas.berkeley.edu
Edited by:
Scott A. Huettel, Duke University, USA
Keywords: decision making, decision neuroscience, neuroeconomics, uncertainty, risk, contextual influences, situational influences, individual differences
In our everyday life we often have to make decisions with uncer-
tain consequences, for instance in the context of investment
decisions. To successfully cope with these situations, the ner-
vous system has to be able to estimate, represent, and eventually
resolve uncertainty at various levels. That is, not only are there
different forms of uncertainty with different consequences for
behavior and learning but research indicates that the processing of
uncertainty highly depends on situation and context. The present
research topic includes both review and original research articles
that seek to shed light on the neural processes underlying decision
making under uncertainty with a particular focus on situational
and contextual influences.
First, Bland and Schaefer (2012) review the diverse (and
often overlapping) definitions of uncertainty. They identify three
main forms—expected uncertainty (including risk), unexpected
uncertainty and volatility—and review theoretical and empir-
ical evidence that supports this dissociation. Several original
research articles then aim to either directly compare different
forms of uncertainty or to identify further dissociations within
these forms. Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2012) systemati-
cally vary unexpected and estimation uncertainty to study what
drives exploration (as opposed to exploitation). They report
that humans both seek out new reward opportunities (“curiosity
motive”) and avoid the unknown (“cautiousness motive”), result-
ing in exploration and exploitation, respectively. O’Reilly (2013)
addresses the same forms of uncertainty in the context of learning
with a particular focus on how an organism should adapt their
rate of learning in changing environments. Hansen et al. (2012)
on the other hand show that decisions made under perceptual vs.
categorical uncertainty are differentially affected by prior knowl-
edge such that prior knowledge increases visual cortical activity
when uncertainty is driven by the sensory stimulus itself rather
than at the cognitive level.
The next set of papers explores situational and contextual
aspects of expected uncertainty. First, Studer et al. (2012) demon-
strate that neural responses in a distributed network of choice
under risk increase when subjects actively choose a risky gamble
as opposed to being passively exposed to risk when a computer
chooses that gamble. Kim et al. (2012) study what information
decision makers attend to when either choosing between two lot-
teries or betting on a single lottery. Using eye-tracking data they
observe task-dependent attentional shifts from probabilities to
amounts which may influence the (neural) computation of value.
Consequently, individuals often chose options with higher prob-
abilities but place higher bids on options with higher amounts.
Schönberg et al. (2012) used the Balloon Analog Risk Taking task
to study the neural network underlying naturalistic risk-taking.
They find that brain activity in a network previously related
to risk increases as individuals continue to inflate a balloon—
thus, increasing their risk—while activity in a value-related brain
region decreases at the same time. Levin et al. (2012) then review
the literature on how risk processing differs between the gain
and loss domain. They argue that different neural systems indi-
cate different neural and psychological processes for risk-taking
in gains and losses. Finally, Heilbronner and Hayden (2013)
round off this set of papers by providing an account of risk-
seeking behavior. While risk-seeking is usually observed in only
a minority of human study participants, it is the dominant form
of risk preference observed in monkey studies. Heilbronner and
Hayden review the literature on this phenomenon and argue
that monkeys aren’t risk-seeking per se but are driven toward
risk-seeking by experimental design and training and that under
similar conditions rats and humans would behave the same way.
Finally, a third set of papers represents an increasingly fertile
area of research by connecting risk-taking to the social contexts
and affective processes underlying behavior. Tang et al. (2011)
report that socially anxious individuals demonstrate decreased
risk aversion and that the degree of social anxiety correlates with
activity in anterior insula. Jung et al. (2013) compare the number
of risky choices participants made for themselves or for others.
They find that at low probabilities subjects are less risk taking
for own decisions as opposed to high probabilities where the
effect is reversed. This difference in preferences toward risk is
underlined by partially distinct neural networks that are recruited
when choosing for oneself or for others. Using a model-based
approach, Zhu et al. (2012) connect social risk and learning, and
demonstrate that age-related differences in social learning can
be succinctly captured by a set of models widely used in eco-
nomics. Gaertig et al. (2012) use an ultimatum game to show that
positive social information about the proposer increases accep-
tance rates by the responder. This effect was further enhanced
by the presence of uncertainty. Finally, Wu et al. (2012) provide
an affective neuroscience account of decision making under risk
thereby connecting the quantitative approach of economic and
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FIGURE 1 | Activation Likelihood Estimate (ALE) meta-analytic maps for high versus low mean, variance, and skewness. ALE of mean: bilateral NAcc.
ALE of variance: bilateral anterior insula. ALE of skewness: left NAcc. (based on Wu et al., 2012).
financial theories with the psychological approach which focuses
on emotion and cognition.
In sum, the papers presented in this research topic demon-
strate several points: First, to fully understand decision making
under uncertainty one has to first dissociate different forms
of uncertainty. Each form impacts behavior and learning in a
different way (Figure 1). Second, choices under each form of
uncertainty can itself be impacted by situational and contextual
factors. Third, social context is an important source of uncer-
tainty that is often driven or influenced by affective processes. We
can further contend that risk remains the most popular and most
powerful form of uncertainty for studying choice under uncer-
tainty. The quantitative framework provided by choice under
risk allows the careful study of the impact of situational and
contextual factors on preferences and choice. However, as most
situations in real life are infused with unexpected uncertainty and
volatility rather than expected uncertainty (risk), future research
will show how the factors identified in this issue influence other
forms of uncertainty, to which degree common mechanism exist
and how they can account for the various influences identified
so far.
REFERENCES
Bland, A. R., and Schaefer, A. (2012). Different varieties of uncertainty
in human decision-making. Front. Neurosci. 6:85. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.
00085
Gaertig, C., Moser, A., Alguacil, S., and Ruz, M. (2012). Social
information and economic decision-making in the ulti-
matum game. Front. Neurosci. 6:103. doi: 10.3389/fnins.
2012.00103
Hansen, K. A., Hillenbrand, S. F., and Ungerleider, L. G. (2012). Effects
of prior knowledge on decisions made under perceptual vs. cate-
gorical uncertainty. Front. Neurosci. 6:163. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.
00163
Heilbronner, S. R., and Hayden, B. Y. (2013). Contextual factors explain
risk-seeking preferences in rhesus monkeys. Front. Neurosci. 7:7. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2013.00007
Jung, D., Sul, S., and Kim, H. (2013). Dissociable neural processes under-
lying risky decisions for self versus other. Front. Neurosci. 7:15. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2013.00015
Kim, B. E., Seligman, D., and Kable, J. W. (2012). Preference reversals in deci-
sion making under risk are accompanied by changes in attention to different
attributes. Front. Neurosci. 6:109. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00109
Levin, I. P., Xue, G., Weller, J. A., Reimann, M., Lauriola, M., and Bechara,
A. (2012). A neuropsychological approach to understanding risk-taking for
potential gains and losses. Front. Neurosci. 6:15. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00015
O’Reilly, J. X. (2013). Making predictions in a changing world-inference, uncer-
tainty, and learning. Front. Neurosci. 7:105. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00105
Payzan-LeNestour, E., and Bossaerts, P. (2012). Do not bet on the unknown versus
try to find out more: estimation uncertainty and “unexpected uncertainty” both
modulate exploration. Front. Neurosci. 6:150. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00150
Schönberg, T., Fox, C. R., Mumford, J. A., Congdon, E., Trepel, C., and Poldrack,
R. A. (2012). Decreasing ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity during sequen-
tial risk-taking: an FMRI investigation of the balloon analog risk task. Front.
Neurosci. 6:80. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00080
Studer, B., Apergis-Schoute, A. M., Robbins, T. W., and Clark, L. (2012). What
are the odds? The neural correlates of active choice during gambling. Front.
Neurosci. 6:46. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00046
Tang, G. S., van den Bos, W., Andrade, E. B., and McClure, S. M. (2011). Social
anxiety modulates risk sensitivity through activity in the anterior insula. Front.
Neurosci. 5:142. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2011.00142
Wu, C. C., Sacchet, M. D., and Knutson, B. (2012). Toward an affective
neuroscience account of financial risk taking. Front. Neurosci. 6:159. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2012.00159
Zhu, L., Walsh, D., and Hsu, M. (2012). Neuroeconomic measures of
social decision-making across the lifespan. Front. Neurosci. 6:128. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2012.00128
Received: 22 October 2013; accepted: 30 October 2013; published online: 20 November
2013.
Citation: Preuschoff K, Mohr PNC and Hsu M (2013) Decision making under
uncertainty. Front. Neurosci. 7:218. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00218
This article was submitted to Decision Neuroscience, a section of the journal Frontiers
in Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2013 Preuschoff, Mohr and Hsu. This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this jour-
nal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 218 | 2
